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REPRESENTING POLICE OFFICERS AND
MUNICIPALITIES: A CONFLICT OF INTEREST FOR
A MUNICIPAL ATTORNEY IN A § 1983
POLICE MISCONDUCT SUIT
Nicole G. Tell*
INTRODUCrION
In October 1996, in Bronx County, New York, police officer Francis
X. Livoti was acquitted of criminally negligent homicide.' Officer
Livoti was involved in a confrontation with Anthony Baez that ensued
after a football Baez had been tossing hit Livoti's police car.2 Officer
Livoti placed Baez-who, according to Livoti, was resisting arrest-in
a chokehold that resulted in Baez's death on December 22, 1994. The
ultimate decision in the Livoti case sparked the public's already in-
creasing distrust of police officers, and their strong belief that police
officers, fueled by too much power and prejudice, commonly violate
citizens' constitutional rights.3 Because many believe that justice is
not being served against police officers in criminal court, victims have
increasingly turned, instead, to the civil halls of justice.4 The public,
however, may not be aware of the government's involvement in the
civil process, where the municipality often provides representation for
the police officer, and may also pay for any settlement or judgment
amounts levied against the officer.
For example, the Baez family has brought a $48 million wrongful
death suit against the city of New York.- In addition to a civil wrong-
ful death suit, the Baez family also could bring a § 19836 action against
* I would like to thank Professor Russell Pearce for his assistance with this Note
and the Stein Scholars Program for sparking my interest in the study of legal ethics.
In addition, I would like to thank my friends, family, and especially Rich for contin-
ued patience and support.
1. State v. Livoti, 632 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1995).
2. David Gonzalez, For a Mother, Vindication and Sorrow, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8,
1997, at 23.
3. See David Kocieniewski, Dismissal Is Urged for Police Officer in a Bronx
Death, N.Y. Tmes, Feb. 8, 1997, at 1. A large rally of citizens stood by the courthouse
chanting and shouting, "No Justice, No Peace," as helmeted police officers cheered
the verdict and attempted to keep the peace. Jorge Fitz-Gibbon et aL, Threats of
Death vs. Livoti, Daily News, Oct. 9, 1996, at 8; Mike McAlary, The Police Cheer
While the Citizens Jeer, Daily News, Oct. 9, 1996, at 8.
4. This trend towards civil justice is not a recent phenomenon but has been in-
creasing over the past twenty years. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); see also Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66
F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing the civil rights action brought by the passenger
in Rodney King's car). As Judge Scheindlin read Officer Livoti's not guilty verdict, a
man screamed, "Where do we go for justice?" Jim Dwyer, Police DepL Goes Soft on
Its Brutes, Daily News, Oct. 10, 1996, at 8.
5. Kocieniewski, supra note 3, at 1.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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Officer Livoti, in both his individual and official capacities, as well as
against the City of New York. Section 1983 provides a civil right of
action for violations of constitutional rights by persons acting under
color of state law.7 Under this statute, if the Baez family sued Livoti
in his official capacity, the City would be liable if the Baez family
could prove that their son's constitutional rights were violated while
Officer Livoti acted according to a formal policy or custom of the mu-
nicipality. The Baez family may also sue Officer Livoti in his individ-
ual capacity. In such an action, the Baez family would avoid the
requirement of showing a formal policy or informal custom, and
would merely need to prove that Livoti's actions deprived Anthony
Baez of a constitutional right.' Officer Livoti's defense to his own
personal liability would be that he was acting in the scope of his duties
as a police officer, following the standard practice and procedure of
such employment. This defense, if successful, would shield Officer
Livoti from personal liability and would shift responsibility to the City
of New York. New York City, as it has done in the Baez family's
wrongful death action, would most likely argue that Officer Livoti was
not acting according to any policy or custom, but rather for his own
purposes.9
Although blame-shifting between defendants is common in § 1983
litigation,' the same attorney often defends both the police officer
and the municipality in a § 1983 suit." This dual representation, how-
ever, appears to contravene the ethical rules on conflicts of interest. 12
These prohibitions against representing clients with adverse, or even
potentially adverse, interests have been at the core of every ethical
code for lawyers since the beginning of the Anglo-American judicial
7. The statute provides, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the dep-
rivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in eq-
uity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
8. See infra part I.A.
9. See Jorge Fitz-Gibbon, City Says Livoti Acted on His Own, Daily News, Oct.
23, 1996, at 13.
10. See Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 907 (2d Cir. 1984) (explaining
how the structure of § 1983 actions against municipalities and employees promotes
liability shifting).
11. The Officer Livoti scenario is an egregious example. Due to the high level of
publicity in this case and commentary about Livoti's questionable conduct, the New
York City Corporation Counsel would most likely claim, as they did in the wrongful
death action, that Officer Livoti was not acting as a city employee but rather on his
own. See Fitz-Gibbon, supra note 9, at 13. In fact, Officer Livoti was fired from the
police force and, therefore, would not be eligible for representation.
12. See infra part II (discussing the ethical rules that are potentially violated in
§ 1983 cases where the municipal attorney jointly represents the police officer and the
municipality).
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system. 3 Current ethical rules exist to guard against dual representa-
tion,'4 because such representation may undermine a lawyer's duty of
loyaltyl'-a duty which encompasses all aspects of attorney-client re-
lations, including duties of competence, 6 confidentiality,' and zeal-
ous advocacy.18
Despite the importance placed on avoiding such conflicts, evidence
suggests that municipal attorneys often overstep ethical boundaries in
their joint representation of police officers and municipalities in police
misconduct cases. Attorney conflict of interest questions are among
the most frequently litigated of all ethical cases,19 and have been the
subject of much scholarly discussion in the past few years 20 Nonethe-
less, few courts or disciplinary bodies have questioned the conduct of
municipal attorneys in this context.
This Note explores the conflicts that can arise when municipal attor-
neys attempt to represent both the police officer and the municipality
in § 1983 police misconduct cases. This Note argues that inherent con-
flicts of interest should preclude a municipal attorney from represent-
ing both clients in the defense of a § 1983 action. This Note further
argues that the only way a police officer's interests can be effectively
represented is when he obtains outside counsel from the outset of the
lawsuit. Although jurisdictions have been reluctant to adopt a per se
rule against dual representation in § 1983 conflict of interest situa-
13. See Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 1244, 1292 n.43 (1981) [hereinafter Developments] (noting that simulta-
neous representation was prohibited in the London Ordinance of 1280, one of the
earliest professional codes).
14. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 (1983) [hereinafter Model
Rules]; Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 5, Canon 9 (1980) [herein-
after Model Code]; see Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Rep-
resentation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confitsion and
Controversy, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 211,211-12 (1982); Donald R. McMinn, Note, ABA For-
mal Opinion 88-356: New Justification for Increased Use of Screening Devices to Avert
Attorney Disqualification, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1231, 1238 (1990).
15. Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.7 cmt. 1.
16. Id. Rule 1.1.
17. Id Rule 1.6.
18. Id. Rule 1.3 cmt. 1.
19. See Randall B. Bateman, Return to the Ethics Rules as a Standard for Attorney
Disqualification: Attempting Consistency in Motions for Disqualification by the Use of
Chinese Walls, 33 Duq. L. Rev. 249, 249 (1990) (explaining that there has been an
increase in motions to disqualify attorneys for conflicts of interest); Marc . Steinberg
& Timothy U. Sharpe, Attorney Conflicts of Interest: The Need for a Coherent Frame-
work, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 1 (1990).
20. See I Geoffrey C. Hazard & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A
Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 1.1:101 (2d ed. Supp. 1997)
[hereinafter Hazard & Hodes, Law of Lawyering]; Russell G. Pearce, Family Values
and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses, 62
Fordham L. Rev. 1253, 1260 (1994); Charles W. Wolfram, The Concept of a Restate-
ment of the Law Governing Lawyers, 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 195 (1987). See generally
Developments, supra note 13 (discussing the various conflicts of interest faced by
attorneys).
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tions,2' this Note will demonstrate why separate representation should
be required from the beginning of the lawsuit. A per se rule will help
overcome the difficulties that courts face in deciding whether a con-
flict is substantial enough to disqualify an attorney,22 and will cure the
lack of enforcement by courts and disciplinary bodies of conflict rules
violations.23 This solution may also help ease the stress on the munici-
pal attorney, who must continually struggle to guard her client's confi-
dences and protect their interests.24
By way of background, part I describes the basic structure of § 1983
police misconduct suits and highlights four key differences between
the nature of a § 1983 action against a police officer and a municipal-
ity. Part II applies the attorney conflict rules to the representation of
police officers and municipalities in § 1983 actions, and identifies
when during the representation the conflicts are most likely to occur.
In response, part III examines how courts and disciplinary bodies have
addressed these conflicts, and finally, argues that a per se rule against
municipal attorneys representing police officers and municipalities in
§ 1983 actions is warranted to avoid conflicts of interest.
I. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLICE OFFICER LIABILITY UNDER
SECTION 1983
Section 198321 creates a civil cause of action against persons who
violate federal constitutional or statutory rights while acting under
color of state law. Congress enacted § 1983 "to enforce provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of au-
thority of a State [or local government] and represent it in some ca-
pacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse
it."'26 Prior to 1978, the only local governmental actors that could be
sued under § 1983 were the individual police officers or employees of
the municipality. 27 In Monell v. Department of Social Services,28 a
21. See Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 85 F.3d 489, 493 (10th Cir. 1996);
Silva v. Witschen, 19 F.3d 725, 732 (1st Cir. 1994); Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1142,
1147-48 (7th Cir. 1987); Gordon v. Norman, 788 F.2d 1194, 1198 (6th Cir. 1986); Rich-
mond Hilton Assocs. v. City of Richmond, 690 F.2d 1086, 1089 (4th Cir. 1982);
Kounitz v. Slaatten, 901 F. Supp. 650, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Clay v. Doherty, 608 F.
Supp. 295, 305 (E.D. IMI. 1985); Barkley v. City of Detroit, 514 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994); Minneapolis Police Officers Fed'n v. City of Minneapolis, 488 N.W.2d
817, 819-20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); In re Opinion 552 of Advisory Comm. on Profes-
sional Ethics, 507 A.2d 233, 235 (N.J. 1986); Galligan v. City of Schenectady, 497
N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (App. Div. 1986).
22. See infra part III.A; see also Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation:
The Judicial Role, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 71, 120-21 (1996) (describing the "fragmented"
standards that courts employ to determine disqualification of attorneys).
23. See infra part III.A.
24. See infra part II.A.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
26. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961)).
27. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187-92.
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turning point in § 1983 litigation, however, the Court extended liabil-
ity by finding municipalities to be liable under § 1983.29 Now that
both the municipality-the "deep pocket" defendant-and the police
officer can be held liable for constitutional deprivations, most suits for
police misconduct include claims against the municipality. Many dif-
ferences exist, however, between § 1983 actions against municipalities
and police officers. This section identifies the four major differences
between these representations: 1) theories of liability; 2) available de-
fenses; 3) damages; and 4) degree of control over both the nature of
the representation and indemnification as to expenses and damages.
As revealed later in this Note,30 these differences present conflict
problems for the representing attorney throughout the litigation.
A. Police Officers and Municipalities Are Held Liable Under
Different Theories
The nature of the liability in a § 1983 action for the two defend-
ants-the police officer and the municipality-are quite distinct. Po-
lice officers are found liable when, while acting under color of state
law, their actions violate a person's constitutional rights. Municipali-
ties, on the other hand, may be liable under § 1983, when the police
officer's actions are found to follow an official policy or practice of the
municipality.
1. Police Officers' Liability
Under § 1983, courts may hold police officers liable for constitu-
tional violations when their actions are an abuse of their official posi-
tion. Thus, if an officer, in the course of his duties "under color of
[state law]," engages in activity which causes a deprivation of a consti-
tutional right, the officer may be subject to suit under § 1983.31
When police officers are acting "under color of [law], 32 they are
directly liable both as police officers and individual persons because
their actions violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Therefore,
plaintiffs may seek to bring suit against the officer in both his official,
as well as his individual capacity.3 3 There is, however, an important
28. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
29. Id at 690-91 (overruling Monroe, 365 U.S. 167); see Karen M. Blum, Local
Government Liability Under Section 1983, in Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation &
Attorney's Fees 1994, 329, 335 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Se-
ries No. 511, 1994).
30. See infra part I (discussing conflicts of interest for the municipal attorney in
§ 1983 litigation).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
32. Id
33. When a plaintiff names the police officer in his individual capacity, he is seek-
ing to "impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under
color of state law." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). A person being
sued in his personal capacity comes to the court as an individual, and consequently, a
199'7] 2829
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difference between bringing a § 1983 action against a police officer in
his individual capacity and bringing one in his official capacity. In-
deed, an official capacity suit is "only another way of pleading an ac-
tion against an entity" and is considered a suit against the
municipality.- As long as the government entity receives notice, an
official capacity suit is in all respects but its name a suit against the
entity.35
2. Municipalities' Liability
Although municipalities can be held liable under § 1983 for the ac-
tions of their employees or agents, this liability is not based on a re-
spondeat superior theory; in fact, municipalities cannot be held liable
under a theory of respondeat superior.36 Municipalities may be liable
only when the police officer's actions are based on policies or customs
of the entity.37 In addition, liability may be imposed on municipalities
when the alleged conduct follows from a formally adopted policy or
regulation, or when the practice constitutes an informal custom or
usage.
A § 1983 plaintiff may establish a municipality's liability under the
"custom or usage" prong of Monell by demonstrating that the poli-
cymaking officials have actual or constructive knowledge of, and ac-
quiesce to, the unconstitutional custom or practice.39 A municipality
plaintiff need not establish a connection to a governmental policy or custom in order
to show that the official, acting under color of state law, violated his constitutional
rights. Id. at 166. Personal capacity suits do not necessarily imply that the officer was
acting outside of his official capacity-for example, that the acts were unnecessary to
the performance of his job when the alleged violation took place-they only indicate
that he will be held personally responsible for these actions. See Hafer v. Melo, 502
U.S. 21, 28 (1991).
34. Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 85 F.3d 489, 493 (10th Cir. 1996) (quot-
ing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)); see Steven S. Cushman, Municipal
Liability Under Section 1983: Toward a New Definition of Municipal Policymaker, 34
B.C. L. Rev. 693, 699 (1993); Michael T. Jilka, Immunity Under Section 1983, 65 J.
Kan. B. Ass'n 30, 31 (1996).
35. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. An official capacity suit, therefore, requires a
plaintiff to establish the Monell requirements of an official policy or custom, or prove
a failure to train which amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's needs.
Blum, supra note 29, at 342; see infra part I.A.2.
36. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Blum,
supra note 29, at 336; Cushman, supra note 34, at 701-02.
37. Harvey Brown & Sarah V. Kerrigan, 42 U.S.C. § 1983: The Vehicle for Pro-
tecting Public Employees' Constitutional Rights, 47 Baylor L. Rev. 619, 622 (1995);
Cushman, supra note 34, at 702-03; Neal Miller, Less-Than-Lethal Force Weaponry:
Law Enforcement and Correctional Agency Civil Law Liability for the Use of Exces-
sive Force, 28 Creighton L. Rev. 733, 762 (1995).
38. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986); Bouman v.
Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 640 (1991); Cushman,
supra note 34, at 706-07.
39. McNabola v. Chicago Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 511 (7th Cir. 1993); Fletcher
v. O'Donnell, 867 F.2d 791, 793-94 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919 (1989); Michael
J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal Ac-
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also may be liable, in more limited situations, for failure to train its
employees when such failure indicates a "deliberate indifference" to
the rights of its citizens.' In the context of an excessive force claim, a
failure to train theory might be established if a plaintiff could show
that the city failed to instruct police officers on the constitutional limi-
tations on the use of deadly force.4'
B. Police Officers and Municipalities Have Different
Defenses Available
Police officers and municipalities may be subject to civil liability
under § 1983 based on dissimilar theories of liability, and thus, have
different defenses available to them. The most notable difference is
the availability of the qualified immunity defense to police officers,
but not to municipalities.
1. Police Officer's Defenses
Currently, police officers are afforded a qualified immunity defense
in their individual capacity.42 This qualified immunity is often re-
ferred to as a "good faith" defense because police officers may assert
the defense if they can show that they acted in compliance with the
law as they knew it at the time.43 In Anderson v. Creighton," the
Court held that plaintiffs can defeat a police officer's claim of quali-
fied immunity only when they can allege particular facts that show an
established right, such that it is "sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."4"
countability Under Section 1983, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 539, 587 (1989); Miller, supra note
37, at 762-63.
40. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390-92 (1989) (holding that inadequate
police training may serve as a basis for § 1983 liability).
41. See id. at 390; see also Robinson v. City of St. Charles, 972 F.2d 974, 977 (8th
Cir. 1992) (finding that plaintiff in an excessive force case must prove city both knew
police training was inadequate and deliberately chose to ignore the situation).
42. The Supreme Court has held that, because the notion of official immunity was
grounded in common law, Congress intended that common law absolute immunity
should apply to § 1983 actions against government officials. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S.
914, 920-21 (1984); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). Throughout the twentieth century, however, the
Court has chipped away the common law defense of absolute immunity for govern-
mental officials, and instead has adopted a more functional approach to the immunity
doctrine. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993); Linda Ross Meyer,
When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1467, 1499-500 nn.106-08 (1996).
Because police officers exercise vast power, they enjoy a qualified, rather than an
absolute, immunity. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967); Kit Kinports,
Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 Ga. L Rev.
597, 601-02 (1989).
43. Terry D. Edwards, Police Legal Advisors-Friend or Foe? Ethical Dilemmas
in 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 Litigation, 17 J. Legal Prof. 143, 147 (1992).
44. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
45. Id at 640; see Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc., v.
Federal Communications Comm'n, 116 S. CL 2374, 2390 (1996).
1997] 2831
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With this frequently-employed defense, police officers can partially or
completely avoid personal liability-liability in their individual capac-
ity-by proving that the act was done in good faith and pursuant to
official policy.46
Additionally, a police officer has two different defenses available
when the suit is brought against the police officer in both his individ-
ual and official capacities. Because an official capacity suit is techni-
cally a suit against the municipality,47 a suit naming the police officer
in both capacities is "treated as the transactions of two different legal
personages. '"" Therefore, the police officer is regarded as two differ-
ent people-the municipality and himself individually-with two dif-
ferent defenses, both requiring adequate representation. When the
police officer is sued in his official capacity and is legally treated as the
municipality,49 "the only immunities available to the defendant.., are
those that the governmental entity possesses. '50
2. Municipalities' Defenses
The municipality, unlike the officer, cannot assert a qualified immu-
nity defense based on the good faith of its officials. In Owen v. City of
Independence5 1 the Supreme Court held that "many victims of munic-
ipal malfeasance would be left remediless if the city were also allowed
to assert a good-faith defense. ' 52 In disallowing the good faith ration-
ale, the Court held that municipalities cannot assert a qualified immu-
nity defense in § 1983 actions. Hence, a municipality can avoid
liability only by claiming that no constitutional violation occurred or
by shifting legal responsibility to the police officer by claiming that the
police officer did not act with good faith, i.e., pursuant to a policy,
practice, or custom of the municipality.5 3
46. Just because a police officer asserts a qualified immunity defense, however, it
does not follow that the jury will accept this defense and relieve him of liability in his
individual capacity. A jury may nonetheless believe that the officer acted recklessly
or with wanton indifference and consequently, impose punitive damages on him in his
personal capacity.
47. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985).
48. Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 85 F.3d 489, 493 (10th Cir. 1996) (quot-
ing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 543 n.6 (1986)).
49. See supra part I.A.1.
50. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). See infra part I.B.2 discussing defenses
available to the municipality, and therefore, to the police officer sued in his official
capacity.
51. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
52. Id. at 651; see Mark R. Brown, The Demise of Constitutional Prospectivity:
New Life for Owen?, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 273, 274 (1994).
53. See Gordon v. Norman, 788 F.2d 1194, 1197 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Johnson v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 85 F.3d 489, 493 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that the munici-
pality's defense could be that the official "acted in a manner contrary to the policy or
custom of the entity"). It should be noted, however, that the officer may be deprived
of his qualified immunity defense if the municipality can prove that the officer did not
act according to municipal or departmental policy. Furthermore, the evidence the
2832 [Vol. 65
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C. Police Officers and Municipalities Are Liable for Different
Types of Damages
These co-defendants-the police officer and the municipality-may
also be found liable for different types of damages. The most impor-
tant difference between their damages is that the police officer, unlike
the municipality, can be held liable for punitive damages.
1. Police Officers' Potential Damages
When a plaintiff sues a police officer in his individual capacity, the
officer may be liable for both compensatory and punitive damages,
the latter being available only if the plaintiff shows that the defendant
acted recklessly or with wanton indifferencer 4 Notwithstanding a
finding that the police officer is not liable for compensatory damages,
the fact-finder may still impose punitive damages on the police officer
in his individual capacity, if the jury believes that he acted willfully or
with reckless indifference.5 5 The Supreme Court also has held that the
liable defendant in § 1983 suits should pay the prevailing plaintiff's
attorney's fees absent unusual circumstances that would render such
payment unjust.56
2. Municipalities' Potential Damages
Even if the police officer successfully asserts his qualified immunity
defense, a municipality may be found liable for the constitutional vio-
lation and may be required to pay both compensatory damages and
plaintiff's attorney fees. 7 While punitive damages may be imposed on
the individual police officer, the Supreme Court has found that it
would be against public policy to impose punitive damages against
municipalities.58 Thus, the co-defendants' needs diverge significantly
when they are exposed to relatively disproportionate liability.5 9
D. The Degree of Control over the Nature of the
Representation and Indemnification as to Expenses and
Damages Are Different
Even though the police officer and the municipality are co-defend-
ants, and, therefore, co-clients of the municipal attorney, the munici-
pality often has primary control over the scope of the representation,
municipality might use to support its defense "may very well be the same evidence
establishing liability on behalf of the [police officer]." Edwards, supra note 43, at 147.
54. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983); Gordon, 788 F.2d at 1199.
55. Smith, 461 U.S. at 51.
56. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters. Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
57. See Blum, supra note 29, at 349-50 (explaining that a plaintiff can establish a
successful § 1983 action against the governmental entity even if the individual defend-
ant is entitled to qualified immunity); Jilka, supra note 34, at 36 (same).
58. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
59. See infra part Il.D.
1997] 2833
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as well as the degree, if any, of indemnification provided to the officer.
In considering these matters, municipal attorneys are often guided by
municipal statutes that allow or require the municipality to represent
and indemnify police officers.
1. Municipalities Decide Whether to Provide Representation for
the Police Officer
Most municipalities are mandated by statute to provide counsel for
their employees, including police officers, in civil actions arising out of
their employment.60 Many municipal statutes specify that the munici-
pality will provide representation only for employees acting within the
scope of their employment.61 For the purposes of the municipality's
statutory duty to defend a police officer, an officer is acting within the
scope of his employment "when he is engaged in work he was em-
ployed to perform or when the act is an incident to his duty and was
performed for the benefit of his employer and not to serve his own
purposes or convenience[s]."6 The question of whether an officer's
actions are within the scope, however, must be measured objectively
without regard to his malicious or evil intent.63 A police officer is
usually deemed to be acting within the scope of employment when the
officer acts with the express or implied powers of his public duties,'
even if he used improper methods to carry out his official duties.65
This determination turns not on the specific conduct in question, but
rather on whether the conduct is a foreseeable consequence of the
officer's duties.66
60. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 995 (West 1995) (ensuring representation of em-
ployees of any California public entity); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-155 (West 1993)
(authorizing representation to a member or officer of a municipal police department
or force); N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 18(3)(a) (McKinney 1988) (providing representation
to officers and employees of public entities, except New York State employees or
employees of municipalities that have adopted other local laws); N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law
§ 50-k(2) (McKinney 1986) (ensuring the defense of employees of New York City);
N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-j(5) (McKinney 1986) (providing representation specifically
to police officers).
61. See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 18(3)(a) (McKinney 1988) (stating that defense
is provided for an employee "acting within the scope of his public employment or
duties"); N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law §§ 50-k(2), 50-1, 50-m(l) (McKinney 1986) (same); ac-
cord Cal. Gov't Code § 995 (West 1995) (same).
62. Neal v. Gatlin, 35 Cal. App. 3d 871, 875 (1973) (citing Burgdorf v. Funder, 246
Cal. App. 2d 443 (1966)); see Joel Berger, New York City Corporation Counsel's View-
point, 9 J. Suffolk Acad. L. 69, 72-73 (1994) (explaining that New York City does not
consider officers to be in the scope of their employment when they act as individuals
in personal altercations).
63. Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1142, 1149 (7th Cir. 1987).
64. See Eugene P. Ramirez, Note, Police Misconduct Suits: The Duty to Defend;
The Duty to Indemnify; And Whether There Is a Duty to Provide Separate Counsel
Under California Government Code Section 825, 8 Whittier L. Rev. 1041, 1045 (1987).
65. Coleman, 814 F.2d at 1149.
66. See Blood v. Board of Educ., 509 N.Y.S.2d 530, 532 (App. Div. 1986); see also
Ramirez, supra note 64, at 1045 (explaining the California test for determining "scope
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Larger municipalities, such as New York City, are often more strict
when deciding whether to represent a police officer,67 and, therefore,
have additional requirements in their representation statutes.' Fur-
thermore, some large municipalities have formalized procedures to
determine whether the police officer is eligible for representation by
the municipal attorney.69 Smaller municipalities often do not have
such procedures, which frequently leads to conflicts problems later in
the representation.7 0  Even with so-called "formal" office policies,
however, unforeseen conflicts may nonetheless arise71 because most
municipalities do not have written guidelines on how to make the
determination.72
of employment"). For example, in Blood, a New York State appellate court found
that a school teacher accused of striking a student in the eye with a bookbag was
acting within the scope of the teacher's employment. Blood, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 530.
Because a teacher's anger is a generally foreseeable consequence of his duties, only
extreme conduct, completely removed from his occupational duties, would warrant a
determination by corporation counsel that representation was not required. Id at 532.
This broad definition indicates that a municipality may determine that a police officer
acted within the scope of employment in order to provide him with representation,
yet argue that the officer did not act in good faith. See infra part II.B.
67. See Linda M. Cronin, Defending the Individual Police Officer, 9 J. Suffolk
Acad. L. 83, 89-90 (1994). Cronin explains that suburban Nassau County is more
willing to represent its police officers in a variety of situations than New York City,
which is less responsive to officers' requests for representation. She relates that New
York City no longer thinks of its police officers as "24-hour cops" and will likely find
officers acting outside the scope of employment when off-duty. Id. at 90-91.
68. The New York City Corporation Counsel will not represent a police officer
who was "in violation of any rule or regulation of his agency at the time the alleged
act or omission occurred." N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-k(2) (McKinney 1986). Addi-
tionally, New York City police officers are not eligible for Corporation Counsel's rep-
resentation if any disciplinary proceedings are pending against them by the police
department. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-k(5) (McKinney 1986). If the plaintiff files a
complaint with the Civilian Complaint Review Board and the investigation is in pro-
gress, this would immediately prohibit the city from representing the officer. See
Cronin, supra note 67, at 95.
69. The New York City Corporation Counsel requires that a police officer send a
request for representation to his commanding officer, who makes a recommendation
about representation and then refers the request to the police department's deputy
commissioner of legal matters. If the deputy commissioner endorses the representa-
tion, the request is forwarded to the Corporation Counsel, who makes an additional
determination. Telephone Interview with a Managing Attorney, The New York City
Corporation Counsel (Nov. 19, 1996) [hereinafter Corporation Counsel Interview.
In Detroit, the city council considers the report and recommendation of the corpora-
tion counsel to determine whether the officer should be represented by the corpora-
tion counsel. Barkley v. City of Detroit, 514 N.W.2d 242, 243 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
70. See infra part II.C.
71. See infra part lI.C.
72. Telephone Interview with a Managing Attorney, The New York City Corpora-
tion Counsel (Mar. 4, 1997); Telephone Interview with Taso Kalapoutis, Deputy
County Attorney, The Nassau County Attorney's Office (Mar. 5, 1997) [hereinafter
Nassau Interview]; Telephone Interview with Bob Cabble, Chief of the State and Fed-
eral Torts Bureau, The Suffolk County Attorney's Office (Mar. 6, 1997) [hereinafter
Suffolk Interview]. Additionally, no written procedures-either formal or informal-
exist to guide the municipal attorney throughout the litigation.
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2. Municipalities Decide Whether to Indemnify the Police Officer
In addition to representing police officers, municipalities will often
indemnify officers who are found personally liable under § 1983. In-
demnification statutes typically require that the officer's actions be
within the scope of employment.73 Furthermore, even though the mu-
nicipality initially must have determined for the purpose of providing
representation that the officer was acting within the scope of employ-
ment, the municipality usually makes an independent assessment sub-
sequent to the litigation for the purposes of determining whether the
officer will be indemnified.74
Municipalities have varying standards for affording indemnification
to police officers sued in their individual and official capacities. For
example, New York City makes clear "that representation does not
automatically lead to indemnification." 75 Many municipalities will de-
fend a police officer only after he signs a letter which allows a munici-
pality to defend the officer, but reserves the indemnification decision
until an internal fact-finding process determines that he acted within
the scope of employment.76
Indemnification statutes usually indemnify police officers against
expenses, compensatory damages, or settlement amounts. 77 But un-
like municipalities, police officers liable in their individual capacity
may also have punitive damages imposed against them.78 Police of-
ficers' fears of personal liability have resulted in low morale,79 and
have prompted numerous municipalities to also indemnify for puni-
tive damages levied against them in their individual capacity.80 Mu-
73. See Cal. Gov't Code § 825(a) (West 1995); N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 18(4)(a) (Mc-
Kinney 1988); N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law §§ 50-k(3), 50-1, 50-m (McKinney 1986).
74. In New York City, the city's comptroller makes the final indemnification de-
termination after the litigation. Corporation Counsel Interview, supra note 69. The
municipality is most likely concerned with expending limited funds; consequently, the
decision whether to indemnify is made subsequent to litigation when the municipality
can better evaluate the police officer's actions and calculate how much public money
has already been spent on the defense. Nassau County's statute, however, requires
such scope for indemnification to be determined prior to representation by a majority
vote of a three-person panel. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-1 (McKinney 1986). In Nas-
sau County, indemnification is provided in a vast majority of the cases. Nassau Inter-
view, supra note 72.
75. Berger, supra note 62, at 74.
76. See Ramirez, supra note 64, at 1056. Furthermore, under some "reservation of
rights" letters, the public entity can recover the cost of the defense from the police
officer if it determines that the police officer acted outside the scope of his employ-
ment. Id at 1054.
77. See id. at 1050-51.
78. See supra part I.C.
79. Ramirez, supra note 64, at 1041.
80. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 825(b) (West 1985) (amending earlier statute to
allow city counsel to decide whether to indemnify for punitive or exemplary dam-
ages); N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-1 (McKinney 1986) (allowing Nassau County to in-
demnify police officer for punitive damages); N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-m (McKinney
1986) (same for Suffolk County).
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nicipalities lacking direct statutory authority to indemnify for punitive
damages may nevertheless have the discretion, after the fact, to in-
demnify for such damages 1 But it is often difficult to determine in
advance whether the municipality will indemnify for punitive dam-
ages, or limit indemnification to compensatory damages.
II. APPLYING THE CONFLICTS RUES TO THE REPRESENTATION
OF POLICE OFFICERS AND MUNICIPALITIES IN
SECTION 1983 SuITs
The differences between § 1983 suits against police officers and mu-
nicipalities explained above may result in conflicts of interest for mu-
nicipal attorneys who attempt to jointly represent both defendants.
This part highlights potential ethical conflicts implicated in the context
of joint representation, and reveals how the ethics rules are often too
vague to be applied with any uniformity, and how municipal attorneys
often fail to adhere to current ethics rules. In addition, this part dem-
onstrates that the municipalities' representation statutes provide little
or no guidance to a municipal attorney facing a conflict. Moreover,
most municipalities lack written office procedures on how to proceed
in conflict situations.
The four principle conflicts for a municipal attorney are: (1) pro-
tecting the police officer's communications during the initial screening
interview between the police officer and the attorney; (2) jointly rep-
resenting the municipality and the police officer after determining, at
the initial interview, that the officer may have acted outside the scope
of his employment; (3) continuing the municipality's representation
after the realization by the attorney, during the joint representation,
that the officer may have acted outside the scope of his employment;
and (4) handling issues of settlement, indemnification, and appeal dur-
ing the joint representation of the municipality and the police officer.
A. Protecting the Police Officer's Communications During the
Initial Screening Interview
In most jurisdictions, the municipal attorney is counsel to the mu-
nicipal defendant in § 1983 suits against the municipality. In addition,
most municipal statutes specify that the municipality will defend the
police officer if he acted within the scope of his employment during
the conduct in question.'n Accordingly, it is essential that the munici-
pal attorney first determine whether the officer acted within the
scope, and hence, whether the municipal attorney will provide repre-
81. In New York City, the New York General Municipal Law does not directly
provide for indemnification of punitive damages. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-k(3).
Rather, the Corporation Counsel makes a recommendation regarding whether puni-
tive damages should be indemnified and the Comptroller makes the final determina-
tion. Corporation Counsel Interview, supra note 69.
82. See supra part I.D.1.
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sentation for the police officer along with the municipality. The mu-
nicipal attorney often decides this by reviewing the police
department's investigatory reports and conducting a screening inter-
view with the police officer.83
A potential conflict for the municipal attorney may arise during the
initial screening interview when the police officer may share impor-
tant information which may not necessarily be held in confidence.
This situation violates Model Rule 1.6, which provides that a lawyer
cannot reveal information about her client's representation to anyone,
except as necessary for authorized actions in carrying out such repre-
sentation.' 4 Accordingly, at this stage, the primary concern is deter-
mining if, and when, an attorney-client relationship is created, which
would dictate whether the lawyer owes the police officer a duty of
confidentiality with regard to any information exchanged at the
interview.
"[N]o specific formalities are required to create an attorney-client
relationship," such as a fee agreement, a written letter of acceptance,
or even a handshake.8 5 Frequently when clients meet with lawyers to
discuss their legal problems and seek or obtain advice, an attorney-
client relationship may form.86 Indeed, the American Bar Association
("ABA") has found that unless a "lawyer takes adequate measures to
limit the information initially imparted by the would-be client," Rule
1.6 is applicable to information provided by a prospective client, even
if the lawyer does not eventually undertake this representation. 87 The
ABA and many courts take a "functional" approach to determining
whether an attorney-client relationship exists in screening interviews
or initial consultations.88 It is important to look at what the prospec-
tive client reasonably believed the relationship between himself and
83. Corporation Counsel Interview, supra note 69; Nassau Interview, supra note
72; see William H. Pauley III, Representing the Police Department, 9 J. Suffolk Acad.
L. 77, 78 (1994).
84. Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.6. Rule 1.6 applies to any information
revealed to the lawyer relating to the client's representation, and is not restricted to
communications by the client. Id. Rule 1.6 cmt. 5. The lawyer's duty of confidentiality
is different from the attorney-client evidentiary privilege that protects the disclosure
of certain client communications in judicial proceedings. See ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 358, at 3 (1990) (explaining the differ-
ence between the Model Rule duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client eviden-
tiary privilege).
85. Debra Bassett Perschbacher & Rex R. Perschbacher, Enter at Your Own Risk:
The Initial Consultation & Conflicts of Interest, 3 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 689, 702 (1990).
86. Bridge Prods., Inc. v. Quantum Chem. Corp., No. 88-C10734, 1990 WL 70857,
at *4 (N.D. IMl. Apr. 27, 1990); Perschbacher & Perschbacher, supra note 85, at 702-03
nn.50-52.
87. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 358, at 1
(1990).
88. lI. at 8.
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the lawyer to be when he disclosed communications.Y9 The lawyer can
properly guard against this imposition of an attorney-client relation-
ship, however, by clearly explaining to the prospective client that com-
munications may not be held in confidence, or by obtaining a waiver
of confidentiality from the prospective client.9°
In addition, Model Rule 1.13, guiding the conduct of organizational
attorneys, alters the requirements of Rule 1.6.91 It provides that when
organizational attorneys conduct interviews to investigate wrongdo-
ing, Rule 1.6 protects the employee's confidences from being revealed
to third parties only, but not from the entity client.92 Therefore, the
municipal attorney may be permitted to reveal the officer's communi-
cations to the municipality, as long as this process is clearly and fully
explained to the officer in advance.
The problem, however, is that without formal policies to guide
them, municipal attorneys are not uniformly trained to fully explain
their role during the screening interview. For example, even in New
York City, where the corporation counsel "Mirandizes" the police of-
ficer during the screening interview,93 the attorneys are not told that
they have to explain to the police officer exactly what those conflictsmight be. 4 Additionally, there is no standard procedure that munici-
pal attorneys are required to follow in order to explain the structure
of § 1983 suits and joint representation.95 For this reason, an officer
89. See id.; Bridge Prods., Inc. v. Quantum Chem. Corp., No. 88-C10734, 1990 WL
70857, at *4 (N.D. IlM. Apr. 27, 1990) (focusing on what the client, rather than the
attorney, reasonably believed about the relationship); DCA Food Indus., Inc. v. Tasty
Foods, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 54,59-60 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (applying test set out in Westing-
house Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 955 (1978)); Perschbacher & Perschbacher, supra note 85, at 703 & n.52
(noting that attorney-client relationships have been found where the client reasonably
believed the attorney was acting in such a capacity).
90. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 358, at 6
(1990); see John J. Doyle, Jr. & Michael L. Blumenthal, The Defendants' Perspective:
Ethical Considerations in Representing and Counseling Multiple Parties in Employ-
ment Litigation, 10 Lab. Law. 19, 32-33 (1994).
91. See Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.13 cmt. 3.
92. Id, For example, an in-house corporate attorney who is interviewing an em-
ployee of the corporation in order to investigate corporate wrongdoing cannot reveal
any information she obtains to outside authorities, but may reveal those confidences
to the corporate officers in charge.
93. Perschbacher & Perschbacher, supra note 85, at 690; Richard C. Solomon,
Wearing Many Hats: Confidentiality and Conflicts of Interest Issues for the California
Public Lawyer, 25 Sw. U. L. Rev. 265, 333-34 (1996). The New York City Corporation
Counsel's municipal attorneys explain to the police officer that they currently repre-
sent the city, but reserve the right to determine whether they will also represent the
officer. The municipal attorneys also explain that the officer's communications will
not necessarily be held in confidence and that conflicts may exist in the joint represen-
tation of the municipality and the police officer. Corporation Counsel Interview,
supra note 69.
94. Corporation Counsel Interview, supra note 69.
95. Id; Nassau Interview, supra note 72; Suffolk Interview, supra note 72. The
court in Dunton v. County of Suffolk recognized this problem when they noted that
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may be unsure about the true purpose of the initial screening inter-
view, and unaware of the attorney's duty of confidentiality, or lack
thereof, during the screening interview. Moreover, some municipali-
ties, New York City for example, obtain the police officer's waiver of
Rule 1.6's duty of confidentiality.96 This waiver permits an attorney to
turn over information gathered during the initial interview, and during
the defense of the police officer, to third parties, such as the District
Attorney's office or other appropriate enforcement agencies. 97 This
waiver is very "controversial" 8 because it is difficult to determine
whether the police officer's consent to the waiver is fully informed and
not coerced.99
More importantly, municipal attorneys who provide no explanation
of their role create an implied attorney-client relationship, 100 because
the officer could reasonably believe that an attorney-client relation-
ship exists. Therefore, any subsequent conduct of the attorney must
follow the rules of formal attorney-client relationships. Often, when
the police officer walks into the municipal attorney's office, he already
thinks that she is his attorney.1 1 If the police officer believes that he
is meeting with his personal lawyer, then it becomes extremely prob-
lematic when municipal attorneys fail to explain their role as mere
screening agents.
The power that most municipal representation statutes vest in mu-
nicipal attorneys creates an additional conflict. The initial determina-
tion of whether the officer's actions were within the scope of his
employment, so as to qualify him for representation, is within the mu-
nicipal attorney's discretion.0 Because the municipality may not be
obligated to provide for the police officer's defense if the officer was
acting outside the scope of his employment, the municipal attorney
the initial letter to the police officer informing him of potential conflicts was inade-
quate. 729 F.2d 903, 909 (2d Cir. 1984); see Doyle & Blumenthal, supra note 90, at 23;
see also England v. Town of Clarkstown, 634 N.Y.S.2d 958, 959 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (find-
ing that Town failed to contradict officers' claims that they were never informed of the
potential conflicts that could occur in § 1983 actions, and that they could be found
personally liable).
96. Berger, supra note 62, at 75.
97. See id. (discussing the representation letter the police officer must sign requir-
ing him to waive his attorney-client confidentiality ethical rule).
98. Id
99. Mary C. Daly, An Overview of Ethical Dilemmas, 9 J. Suffolk Acad. L. 113,
120 (1994).
100. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text; Perschbacher & Perschbacher,
supra note 85, at 703.
101. See Perschbacher & Perschbacher, supra note 85, at 690, 702-03.
102. See Barkley v. City of Detroit, 514 N.W.2d 242, 244 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)
(finding that the city council's decision to represent is final); Williams v. New York,
476 N.E.2d 317, 317 (N.Y. 1985) (stating that scope-of-employment determination is
to be made by corporation counsel); Nassau Interview, supra note 72.
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may be pressured to closely scrutinize the police officer's conduct. 1°3
The municipality has an interest in preserving limited public funds and
labor, and the possibility exists that pressure from her superiors may
influence the municipal attorney's finding as to the officer's actions. 104
Therefore, a municipal attorney may be inclined to deem any ques-
tionable conduct by the police officer to be outside the scope of his
employment, thus leaving the police officer to pay for his own
representation. 10 5
B. Jointly Representing the Municipality and the Police Officer
After Initially Determining that the Police Officer May Have
Acted Outside the Scope of Employment
If the municipal attorney determines, after the initial interview, that
the police officer may have been acting outside the scope of his em-
ployment, the co-defendant's defenses will diverge. If the municipal-
ity argues that the police officer was not acting within the scope of his
employment, it may escape liability and shift responsibility to the po-
lice officer in his individual capacity. In contrast, the officer, to avoid
liability in his individual capacity, will always argue that his actions
were in fact done pursuant to an official policy or custom-thus shift-
ing legal responsibility to the municipality.
The above example presents multiple ethical conflicts. The ethical
rules prohibit a lawyer from simultaneously representing two or more
clients when the interests of one may be in conflict with another. 06
Except for a few limited exceptions, Model Rule 1.7(a) bars a lawyer
from representing a client whose interests are "directly adverse" to
103. This is most apparent in municipalities that refuse to reimburse a police officer
who retains outside counsel. In some municipalities, however, an attorney who thinks
that the officer may have done something wrong will transfer the case to outside
counsel paid for by the municipality. This is the usual practice in Nassau County,
Long Island. Nassau Interview, supra note 72.
104. See Minneapolis Police Officers Fed'n v. City of Minneapolis, 488 N.W.2d 817,
822 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that city tends to "make choices of representation
that maximize economy, expertise, and efficiency"); Robert W. Schmidt, The Nassau
County System of Indennification, 9 J. Suffolk Acad. L 43, 47 (1994) (explaining the
pressure placed upon municipal attorneys to keep cases in-house).
105. See Cronin, supra note 67, at 95. The determination that the police officer
acted outside the scope of his employment may also impact the municipality's deci-
sion about indemnification. See supra part I.D.2 Additionally, due to the broad defi-
nition of "within the scope," the attorney may make a hasty determination that the
officer acted within the scope of employment to provide him with representation. See
supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text. This may create problems later in the liti-
gation. See infra part II.C.
106. Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.7. Rule 1.7(a) provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not ad-
versely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
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another client. 10 7 Comments to the Model Rules suggest that subsec-
tion (a) would apply only to the representation of opposing parties in
litigation.108 The comments do recognize, however, that "impermissi-
ble conflict" may arise in other situations if there is a "substantial dis-
crepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in
relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially
different possibilities of settlement ... or liabilities in question."10 9
Model Rule 1.7(a), however, allows an attorney to jointly represent
multiple clients if two prerequisites are met: fully informed consent
by both parties to the representation, 0 and the lawyer's reasonable
belief that this representation will not adversely affect the relationship
with the other client."'
When municipal attorneys jointly represent both a municipality and
a police officer, who may have acted outside the scope of his employ-
ment, they violate the ethics rules." 2 An ethical violation occurs be-
cause a direct conflict exists between the co-defendant's defenses, and
Rule 1.7(a) would prevent such simultaneous representation." 3 Due
to outside pressures, it seems unlikely that there could be any mean-
ingful waiver of the conflicts by the clients in this situation." 4 In addi-
tion, even if the clients could waive the conflicts, no attorney could
107. Id.; see Hazard & Hodes, Law of Lawyering, supra note 20, § 1.7:207.
108. Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.7 cnt. 7.
109. Id.
110. Id Rule 1.7(a)(2).
111. Id Rule 1.7(a)(1). The Model Rules shed no light on the meaning of "reason-
ably believes" in this context, except to say that the term indicates situations in which
the lawyer thinks the matter or circumstances are reasonable. Id. Terminology cmt. 8.
112. The Dunton v. County of Suffolk case provides a classic example of the dan-
gers involved in jointly representing these co-defendants. 729 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1984).
In that police misconduct action, the Suffolk County Attorney answered the com-
plaint with the affirmative defense that Officer Pfeiffer was acting in good faith pursu-
ant to official policy. Id. at 906. At trial, however, he argued that Pfeiffer did not act
within the duties of a police officer. Id (finding the County Attorney's remarks that
Pfeiffer "was acting as an irate husband rather than a police officer" to be indicative
of actions outside the scope of employment). The Dunton court held that the County
Attorney had violated the ethics rules prohibiting an attorney from representing cli-
ents with adverse interests and those cautioning against the appearance of impropri-
ety. Id. at 908.
113. Additionally, when a suit is brought against the police officer in his individual
and official capacities, the same conflict of interest would exist for an attorney who
attempts to represent the police officer in both capacities. As noted above, an official
capacity suit is considered to be a suit against the entity, and as such is conceived as if
equivalent to the action against the municipality. See supra notes 34-35 and accompa-
nying text. Hence, if a direct conflict exists between the defenses of these co-defend-
ants, the ethical rules would prohibit the same attorney from representing the police
officer in both capacities. Under Model Rule 1.7(a), the police officer would need
one attorney to represent him in his official capacity-the municipal attorney-and a
different attorney to represent him in his individual capacity. See Model Rules, supra
note 14, Rule 1.7(a).
114. Each client must consent after consultation. See Model Rules, supra note 14,
Rule 1.7(a)(2).
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reasonably believe that the representation of the municipality would
not adversely affect the police officer's representation." 5
Meaningful waiver, by either the police officer or the municipality,
would be unlikely for a number of reasons. First, a municipal attorney
and a police officer may be pressured to agree to the joint representa-
tion in order to meet the waiver requirements of Rule 1.7(a). Also, a
police officer may waive a conflict because the municipal attorney has
not adequately explained the conflicts to the officer." 6 In addition,
the police officer may not be able to afford separate representation." 7
Therefore, a police officer may be inclined to waive the conflict due
both to lack of resources and a failure to comprehend the conse-
quences of joint representation.
Even if the police officer waives the conflict, it is also necessary to
secure consent of the municipal-client. Often, however, it is not clear
who is authorized to consent to such a waiver on the municipality's
behalf." 8 Often the municipal attorney herself or her supervisor de-
termines whether the municipality's consent is warranted in a particu-
lar situation. Accordingly, the two requirements of Rule 1.7(a)-
consent of both parties and the attorney's determination that neither
client's representation will be adversely affected--collapse into one
requirement. The vagueness of the Model Rule places too much
power in the hands of the municipal attorney, who may feel pressure
to maintain joint representation." 9 Additional pressure exists in mu-
nicipalities like New York City-where lawsuits are often brought
against the Corporation Counsel by an officer the city has refused to
represent-because it believes he acted outside the scope of his em-
ployment.2 0 Finally, the municipality also may consent to joint repre-
115. The Model Rules require that "the lawyer reasonably believ[e] the representa-
tion will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client. . . ." Id. Rule
1.7(a)(1).
116. See supra part II.A.
117. There is the possibility that police unions could play a role in providing repre-
sentation to police officers in § 1983 actions. See infra note 241.
118. Government lawyers frequently have difficulty identifying their client in order
to determine who has authority to give instructions. Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule
1.13 cmt. 7. According to Rule 1.13, an attorney may undertake the dual representa-
tion of the organization and an individual constituent, but must still meet all the con-
flicts of interest parameters of Model Rule 1.7. Id. Rule 1.13. The problem of
determining when a lawyer can reasonably represent two clients with potential con-
flicts under Rule 1.7 is exacerbated, however, when one of the clients is an entity.
Because it is difficult to determine the specific identity of the government client, its
interests become hard to define.
119. This is particularly true for municipal attorneys who would transfer the case to
outside counsel, paid for by the municipality, if a conflict arose. See Schmidt, supra
note 104, at 47.
120. Cronin, supra note 67, at 94-95; Corporation Counsel Interview, supra note 69;
see Harris v. Rivera, 921 F. Supp. 1058, 1060-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Sometimes, the
police officer brings an action against the municipality if it refuses to indemnify for
expenses or damages. See Mothersell v. City of Syracuse, No. 95-CV-1452 (FJS)
(GJD), 1997 WL 27574, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 22,1997); Torres v. New York City Dep't
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sentation because it would likely help the municipality prove that the
police officer was not acting within the scope of employment. 121
Even if the municipal attorney does not attempt to jointly represent
the police officer and the municipality, the mere determination that
the officer may have acted outside the scope of his employment cre-
ates policy concerns. First, in municipalities statutorily required to
provide representation for the police officer, 122 this determination
may have more than just a financial effect on the police officer who
must then find his own representation. Separate representation may
also prejudice the judge and jury against the police officer: they may
assume that he is not represented by municipal counsel because there
is a concern that his actions were not made in good faith and within
the scope of his employment. As this Note will demonstrate, due to
these concerns, it is better for the police officer to be provided with
separate representation from the initiation of the suit.
C. Continuing the Municipality's Representation After Realizing,
During the Joint Representation, That the Police Officer May
Have Acted Outside the Scope of Employment
If the municipal attorney believes that the officer's actions were
within the scope of his employment, she will usually agree to simulta-
neously represent both the police officer and the municipality. 123 It is
possible, however, that as the simultaneous representation unfolds,
of Corrections, No. 93 Civ. 6296 (MBM), 1995 WL 63159, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15,
1995); Coker v. City of Schnectady, 613 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747 (App. Div. 1994). These
suits, brought on behalf of the police officer by the police officer's union, add to the
continued fight between the union and the Corporation Counsel on how to best han-
dle § 1983 litigation involving police officers. See Cronin, supra note 67, at 90.
121. One alternative to providing joint representation is to transfer the police of-
ficer's representation to a municipal attorney other than the screening attorney, thus
creating the impression of separate representation. A police officer, with limited
funds and limited knowledge of the legal and ethical implications, may be more in-
clined to consent to this type of representation, as he may believe it has less chance of
creating conflicts for the municipal attorney or problems for the police officer.
The transfer of the police officer's representation to another division or to another
municipal attorney, however, does not cure the ethical problem. Vicarious disqualifi-
cation under Rule 1.10 would prohibit a different municipal attorney from represent-
ing the police officer. See Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.10(a). Model Rule 1.10
is employed to prevent the sharing of client confidences between lawyers in the same
firm. Under Rule 1.10, when one lawyer is prohibited from representing a client due
to a conflict of interest, all lawyers associated with her firm are also prohibited from
representing that client. Id This "vicarious disqualification" helps to preserve the
lawyer's duty of loyalty and to avoid the appearance of impropriety against which the
Model Code cautions. See Model Code, supra note 14, Canon 9; Steinberg & Sharpe,
supra note 19, at 10-11.
122. See supra note 60.
123. See Minnesota Police Officers Fed'n v. City of Minneapolis, 488 N.W.2d 817,
820 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that the city attorney can represent co-defendants
when their legal positions are consistent); Schmidt, supra note 104, at 45; Corporation
Counsel Interview, supra note 69; Nassau Interview, supra note 72; Suffolk Interview,
supra note 72.
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the municipal attorney will discover information indicating that the
officer was not acting, in fact, within the scope of his employment.' 24
At this point, the municipality's best interests will be served by aban-
doning the officer and arguing that the officer was not acting in good
faith. 25
This abandonment is effectuated when the police officer's municipal
attorney "cuts him loose," thus requiring the police officer to retain
separate counsel.126 The process of "cutting loose" the police officer
during the joint representation creates a conflict for the municipal at-
torney who then continues to represent the municipal client once she
has been privy to the police officer's communications.'2 7 This creates
a different conflict than the one discussed earlier in which the munici-
pal attorney continues to represent the municipality after the initial
screening interview with the police officer.128 At this stage in the rep-
resentation, the police officer has obviously become the municipal at-
torney's client and different ethical rules are applicable.129
The conflict of interest ethics rules do not only prohibit the repre-
sentation of a person whose interests are adverse to a present client,
but also prohibit such representation when the interests are adverse to
a former client's interests.130 Model Rule 1.9(a) bars lawyers from
representing a client in the "same or a substantially related matter" to
that in which they had represented a former client, if the present cli-
ent's interests are "materially adverse" to the former client's inter-
ests.' 3 ' Such "successive representation" is permissible only with the
124. See Clay v. Doherty, 608 F. Supp. 295, 303 (N.D. MI1. 1985) (describing the
possible conflicts that might arise if new evidence is uncovered); Pauley, supra note
83, at 78 (discussing how during discovery the attorney can learn information from
other police witnesses); Schmidt, supra note 104, at 49-50 (explaining that the initial
determination whether to provide representation may change if additional facts are
learned).
125. See supra part II.B. Although this creates the type of direct conflict of interest
predicament anticipated by Model Rule 1.7(a), municipalities with no--or perhaps
vague-statutory direction may be inclined to continue the joint representauon.
126. Corporation Counsel Interview, supra note 69. Conversely, it is possible that
due to the objective "in-scope" determination for representation by a municipality,
the attorney would continue to find that the officer acted within the scope of his
employment in order to continue to provide representation, while at the same time
argue that the officer acted in bad faith. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
127. The Nassau County Attorney would continue to represent the county after
obtaining separate representation for the police officer. Nassau Interview, supra note
72. Suffolk County, however, has never been in the position of "cutting loose" a po-
lice officer once an attorney-client relationship has been established, although the
possibility exists for this to happen. Telephone Interview with Bob Cabble, Chief of
the State and Federal Torts Bureau, The Suffolk County Attorney's Office (Mar. 18,
1997).
128. See supra part lI.B.
129. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
130. See Marshall J. Breger, Disqualification for Conflicts of Interest and the Legal
Aid Attorney, 62 B.U. L. Rev. 1115, 1117 (1982); Steinberg & Sharpe, supra note 19,
at 5-6.
131. Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.9(a).
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former client's consent. 132 This rule attempts to guard the lawyer's
duty of confidentiality to clients, a duty that is essential to both a law-
yer's duty of loyalty, and to the lawyer-client relationship in
general. 133
Although Rule 1.9(a) prohibits the attorney from representing the
municipality without the former client's consent,' 34 some municipal
attorneys continue representing the entity without the consent of the
police officer. 135 The municipal attorney cannot assume that the po-
lice officer's consent to the original joint representation is sufficient
consent to the subsequent representation of the municipality.136 This
procedure would appear to directly violate the ethics rules on succes-
sive representation.
The municipal attorney's representation of the municipal client vio-
lates Rule 1.9 because such representation cannot pass the "substan-
tial relationship" test that courts use to determine whether an
attorney's disqualification is warranted in a successive representation
conflict. 137 Courts will look closely at the two matters involving the
lawyer and the former client to determine whether there is a substan-
tial relationship between the issues, rather than just between the gen-
eral subject matter. 38 In this situation, the underlying action still
involves the same issues as the representation of the police officer. In
addition, the test is based on an irrebuttable presumption that the at-
torney received information from the former client.' 39 The police of-
ficer confided in the attorney and these confidences could be used
132. See id.; Doyle & Blumenthal, supra note 90, at 31; Steinberg & Sharpe, supra
note 19, at 5-6.
133. See Solomon, supra note 93, at 343-44; Steinberg & Sharpe, supra note 19, at 6;
see also Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.6 cmt. 21 (stating that "[t]he duty of
confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated").
134. Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.9(a).
135. Nassau Interview, supra note 72; see Barkley v. City of Detroit, 514 N.W.2d
242, 246 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that city attorneys violate Rule 1.9 when
information they have received from a former client becomes relevant to a current
client).
136. See N.Y.S. Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 674, at 9 (1995).
137. T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); see Bateman, supra note 19, at 252; Susan R. Martyn, Conflict About Conflicts:
The Controversy Concerning Law Firm Screens, 46 Okla. L. Rev. 53, 53-54 (1993);
Solomon, supra note 93, at 347.
138. T.C. Theatre Corp., 113 F. Supp. at 268; see Bateman, supra note 19, at 252-53;
Developments, supra note 13, at 1328; Martyn, supra note 137, at 54.
139. Bateman, supra note 19, at 252; Developments, supra note 13, at 1328-29; Mar-
tyn, supra note 137, at 54. The test has undergone some modifications and manyjurisdictions are more reluctant to disqualify lawyers in cases that would not have
passed the original substantial relationship test. For example, the Second Circuit will
allow a lawyer to rebut the presumption of shared confidences. Silver Chrysler Plym-
outh Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975). The Second
Circuit has also stated that the standard of proof to rebut the presumption should not
be "unattainably high." Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1056-57 (2d Cir. 1980)
(quoting Silver Chrysler Plymouth Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754
(2d Cir. 1975)), vacated, 450 U.S. 903 (1981).
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against the police officer in the municipality's defense of the § 1983
action. Additionally, a municipal law office that transfers the munici-
pality's representation, at this stage, to another municipal attorney in
its office' 4° does not cure the ethical conffict under Rule 1.9. Rule
1.10(a), as discussed above,14' would vicariously disqualify all munici-
pal lawyers from such representation once one lawyer in the firm is
prohibited from the representation. 14 2
Recently, however, due to an increased acceptance of screening
mechanisms, courts are more willing to tolerate representation of the
present client by another attorney in the firm so long as it is not the
former client's counsel.'4 3 Courts will allow an attorney to rebut the
presumption of shared confidences between herself and the former
client, as well as between herself and the former client's attorney.'"
In order to prevent confidential information from being shared, law-
yers often construct screening mechanisms between the two attorneys
involved in the litigation. These institutional screening mechanisms
seek to prevent the "tainted" attorney from interacting with the newly
assigned attorney. 45 The mechanisms used may be one or more of
the following: structural, such as separating attorneys either physi-
cally or departmentally;146 procedural, such as restricting access to
files; 147 or educational, such as providing programs for lawyers to ex-
plain what information can be discussed and how to respect the
screening procedures."4
With effective screening mechanisms in place, it can be argued that
vicarious disqualification, in former client conflict contexts, should not
apply to large, highly structured law-offices because they will be better
140. The practice of the New York City Corporation Counsel, which has the luxury
of being a larger office, is to transfer the municipality's representation to an attorney
in a different division. Corporation Counsel Interview, supra note 69.
141. See supra note 121.
142. See Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.10(a) (stating that lawyers in the same
firm cannot represent a client when any one lawyer in the firm is prohibited under
Rule 1.9).
143. Bateman, supra note 19, at 267-68; McMinn, supra note 14, at 1254-55; see
Craig A. Peterson, Rebuttable Presumptions and Intra-Firm Screening: The New Sev-
enth Circuit Approach to Vicarious Disqualification of Litigation Counsel, 59 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 399, 409-11 (1984) (advocating screening); Linda A. Winslow, Com-
ment, Federal Courts and Attorney Disqualification Motions: A Realistic Approach to
Conflicts of Interest, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 863, 881-85 (1987) (same).
144. Bateman, supra note 19, at 267-68; McMinn, supra note 14, at 1255.
145. These institutional mechanisms are often referred to as "Chinese Walls," but
this Note will use the phrase "screening mechanisms." Steinberg & Sharpe, supra note
19, at 20; see Bateman, supra note 19, at 251; McMinn, supra note 14, at 1233 n.15;
Andrew P. Romshek, Comment, The Nebraska "Bright Line" Rule: The Automatic
Disqualification of a Law Firm Due to a New Lawyer's or Nonlawyer's Prior Affilia-
tions... Sensible Solution or Serious Setback?, 28 Creighton L. Rev. 213,223 (1994).
146. Breger, supra note 130, at 1145-46; Steinberg & Sharpe, supra note 19, at 28.
147. Breger supra note 130, at 1145; Steinberg & Sharpe, supra note 19, at 27.
148. Steinberg & Sharpe, supra note 19, at 27-28.
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able to protect a former client's confidences.' 49 In large cities, many
government offices are structured in the same departmentalized man-
ner as large corporate law firms.' 50 The New York City Corporation
Counsel, for example, is a large government law office consisting of
numerous divisions.' 5' When the lawyer in the General Litigation Di-
vision decides that a conflict exists between the city and the police
officer, the representation of the city will be transferred to an attorney
in their Torts Division or another division. 52 The city has put into
place certain screening mechanisms between these two lawyers, such
as forbidding the lawyers from discussing the case.15 3
Screening mechanisms, however, may not be as effective in govern-
ment law offices-even large ones-as they can be in complex private
law firms. First, screening mechanisms may be difficult to construct in
government offices where lawyers often have shared support staff, fil-
ing cabinets, and computer files.' 54 Additionally, in contrast to the
private sector, government lawyers are not subject to, and thus will
not be deterred by, pecuniary measures such as prohibiting the
screened attorney from benefitting economically from the representa-
tjon. 55 Moreover, the cost of implementing proper screening mecha-
nisms may outweigh the cost of retaining outside counsel.'56 A final
thing to consider, in any law office contemplating the use of screening
mechanisms, is their inability to protect against intentional
disclosures.' 57
In response to charges that government offices' screening mecha-
nisms are ineffective, it can be argued that vicarious disqualification
should not even be required of government attorneys. This argument
rests on the premise that government attorneys, as advocates for the
public interest, already have the necessary ethical checks on their con-
149. Id at 13-14.
150. Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.10 cmt. 3 (commenting that in certain cir-
cumstances government lawyers who work in separate units should not be considered
as part of the same firm). Some states do not even include an attorney general or city
attorney's office in its definition of law "firm" for the purposes of vicarious disqualifi-
cation. See Minneapolis Police Officers Fed'n v. City of Minneapolis, 488 N.W.2d 817,
821 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
151. See City of New York, The 1994-95 Green Book 228-30 (1995).
152. Corporation Counsel Interview, supra note 69.
153. Id
154. In the Nassau County Attorney's Office, for example, screening mechanisms
would be ineffective due to the small size of the County Attorney's Office and the fact
that the attorneys have shared responsibilities on all § 1983 cases. Nassau Interview,
supra note 72.
155. See Breger, supra note 130, at 1146; Solomon, supra note 93, at 327.
156. Solomon, supra note 93, at 327; see Breger, supra note 130, at 1148-49 (discuss-
ing how legal aid offices often lack the financial resources necessary to construct ef-
fective screening mechanisms).
157. Martyn, supra note 137, at 60; Steinberg & Sharpe, supra note 19, at 28.
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duct to protect a former client's confidences. 158 For instance, public
lawyers do not have the same personal financial incentive that private
lawyers have in their cases.159 Furthermore, there is a notion that gov-
ernment lawyers seek justice above all else,"6 and have less of an in-
centive, as compared to private lawyers, to reveal client confidences
or favor one client over another.
If we take the present ethical rules literally, however, government
attorneys are not, and should not, be exempt from the ethics rules'
vicarious disqualification provisions. Therefore, without effective
screening mechanisms-that are difficult and expensive to construct in
government offices-a municipal attorney cannot continue to repre-
sent the municipality after withdrawing from the police officer's
representation.
D. Handling Issues of Settlement, Indemnification, and Appeal
During the Joint Representation of the Municipality and the
Police Officer
In cases where the police officer is found to have acted within the
scope of his employment, municipal attorneys who undertake the joint
representation often do not seem cognizant of the continuing difficul-
ties that arise with the sensitive issues of settlement, judgment, indem-
nification, and appeal. Each of these concerns invokes the attorney's
duty, under Rule 1.7(b), to reasonably determine whether her repre-
sentation of the police officer will be "materially limited" by her re-
sponsibilities to the municipality.' 6' As this Note demonstrates,
municipal attorneys often do not adhere to this requirement.
158. See, e.g., Keith W. Donohoe, Note, The Model Rules and the Government
Lawyer, A Sword or Shield? A Response to the D.C Bar Special Committee on Gov-
ernment Lawyers and The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 2 Geo. J. Legal Eth-
ics 987, 1000 (1989) (concluding that the government's client is the public interest);
Robert P. Lawry, Confidences and the Government Lawyer, 57 N.C. L Rev. 625, 629
(1979) (finding that the government lawyer has special responsibilities to the public
interest); Jack B. Weinstein & Gay A. Crosthwait, Some Reflections on Conflicts Be-
tween Government Attorneys and Clients, 1 Touro L Rev. 1, 4-5 (1985) (stating that
the government attorney represents the entity and the public).
159. Breger, supra note 130, at 1130-31.
160. See Lawry, supra note 158, at 627.
161. Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.7(b). Rule 1.7(b) provides:
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or
to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests,unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be ad-
versely affected; and(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation
shall include explanation of the implications of the common repre-
sentation and the advantages and risks involved.
Id.; see Model Code, supra note 14, EC 5-15 (stating that anytime an attorney repre-
sents multiple clients with potentially differing interests, she should carefully examine
whether her loyalties will be divided and, when in doubt, decline representation).
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Model Rule 1.7(b) applies to simultaneous representation of par-
ties-either co-parties or two clients involved in a similar matter-
whose interests may conflict.16 Therefore, Rule 1.7(b) applies even
to situations in which there is a potential, rather than a direct conflict
as Rule 1.7(a). In Rule 1.7(b) situations, the lawyer can undertake the
representation only if the client consents after consultation 163 and the
lawyer "reasonably believes" that the representation will not be af-
fected."6 Because Rule 1.7(b) encompasses more questionable con-
flict situations than Rule 1.7(a), it "forces a case-specific inquiry into
the precise effect that a particular combination of conflicting responsi-
bilities might engender.' ' 65
As shown earlier, because of the differences between § 1983 actions
against municipalities and actions against police officers, the co-de-
fendants will have different needs and interests with regard to their
liability, 166 defenses,167 potential damages, 168 and decisions to repre-
sent169 and indemnify.'17  The municipality is often ultimately respon-
sible for the representation of the police officer, and possibly his
settlement or judgments.' 7' In addition, the municipality must con-
sider the expenditure of public funds on a lengthy litigation. 172 For
162. See Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.7 cmt. 7 (commenting that
"[s]imultaneous representation of parties whose interests... may conflict, such as co-
plaintiffs or co-defendants, is governed by paragraph (b)").
163. IL Rule 1.7(b)(2). Rule 1.7(b) differs from 1.7(a) in that 1.7(a) requires con-
sent of both clients. Rule 1.7(b), however, only requires the consent of this particular
client.
164. Id Rule 1.7(b)(1). Rule 1.7(b) differs from 1.7(a) in that 1.7(a) focuses on the
effect another client's representation will have on this client. Rule 1.7(b), however,
asks if this client's representation will be affected by anything at all.
165. Hazard & Hodes, Law of Lawyering, supra note 20, § 1.7:301. The Model
Rules make clear that in order for a client's consent to multiple representation to be
valid, the consultation "shall include explanation of the implications of the common
representation and the advantages and risks involved." Model Rules, supra note 14,
Rule 1.7(b)(2). In the analogous section of the Model Code, the lawyer must provide
"full disclosure" to the clients before they can consent to simultaneous representa-
tion. Model Code, supra note 14, DR 5-105(C). This would require the lawyer to
inform the clients of "both relevant facts and principles of law, the attorney's relation-
ship to the other client, the possible conflicts which may argue for independent coun-
sel, and the scope of the representation." Developments, supra note 13, at 1312 n.137.
As seen in the initial screening interview phase of the representation, the municipal
attorney does not always fully inform the police officer of the structure of § 1983 suits
and the impact that joint representation can have on the police officer's individual
liability. See supra part I.A.
166. See supra part I.A.
167. See supra part I.B.
168. See supra part I.C.
169. See supra part I.D.1.
170. See supra part I.D.2.
171. See supra part I.D.2.
172. See supra part I.D.2. An example of the amount of money a muncipality may
need to expend in defense of police lawsuits is New York City, which spent $270
million between 1986 and 1995 for police lawsuits, and in 1995 alone, the city paid $31
million in damages for police lawsuits. Dwyer, supra note 4, at 8.
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these reasons, the municipal client may want to settle quickly, and
hopefully cheaply, to avoid a long and costly trial. The municipal at-
torney, likewise, may be concerned over the use of taxpayers' money
to fight an expensive litigation that may result in the imposition of
significant damages against the municipality. Also, the municipality
may worry that a trial would bring negative publicity to the municipal-
ity and the entire police department. These reasons may cause the
attorney to pressure the police officer to agree to settle rather than
continue the litigation.
The police officer, in contrast, may have a greater concern for clear-
ing his name of any wrongdoing and fighting the suit to the end; to
him-a settlement may constitute a personal admission of wrongdoing.
The police officer must contend with the fear of punitive damages be-
ing imposed against him in his individual capacity, 7 3 and the fear that
the municipality will not indemnify him for such damages.17 4 A police
officer facing the possibility of compensatory and punitive damages
may want to obtain his own private lawyer, although some municipali-
ties will not indemnify officers who seek their own counsel.1 75 The
issue of indemnification may also affect each defendant's interests in
settlement negotiations. During settlement negotiations, the attorney
discusses settlement amounts with both clients, but most municipali-
ties allow the municipal client the final say in a settlement agree-
ment.176 In New York City, for example, the statute that provides
representation for the police officer requires the city comptroller to
approve the amount of any settlement."7 Although this policy at-
tempts to promote a client-centered approach to litigation, it fails the
ethics rules' proscription on client-driven representation.17 8 It also
173. See supra part I.C.1.
174. See supra part I.D.2.
175. In New York City, the reservation of rights letter that the officer must initially
sign in order to request representation presents a "catch-22" for the police officer, the
letter makes clear that the city will not indemnify for judgments entered against of-
ficers who obtain outside counsel. See Cronin, supra note 67, at 93-94.
176. Corporation Counsel Interview, supra note 69; Nassau Interview, supra note
72. In Suffolk County, the County Attorney has the discretion to settle any amount
below $25,000. In cases involving amounts larger than $25,000, however, legislative
approval by the county is required because the county is self-insured. Suffolk Inter-
view, supra note 72; see Barkley v. City of Detroit, 514 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994) (explaining that the Detroit representation statute requires the officer to
consent to any city-approved settlement in order to receive representation by the
city).
177. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-k(3) (McKinney 1986).
178. The ethics rules prescribe a client-centered approach to representation: The
client directs the litigation, defines the lawful objectives of the representation, accepts
or rejects settlement offers, and decides when to appeal a decision. See Model Rules,
supra note 14, Rule 1.2(a); Model Code, supra note 14, EC 7-7 (stating that the "au-
thority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client"); see also Hayes v. Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc., 513 F.2d 892, 895 (10th Cir. 1975) (finding that the lawyer lacked
authority to settle a client's claim without client ratification).
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underscores how the police officer's representation might be "materi-
ally limited," thus violating Rule 1.7(b). 79
The defendants' often divergent concerns also surface when decid-
ing whether to appeal an unfavorable decision. If the police officer
and the municipality are found liable at the end of litigation, the of-
ficer may want to file an appeal in order to fight his liability to the
very end. Depending on the specific facts, the municipality may not
want to spend additional public funds on an appeal. Because the of-
ficer's case is one of many that the municipality must defend, it may
prefer to save limited funds to fight other, more important cases.' In
New York City, for example, the Chief of Appeals Division at the
Corporation Counsel, while considering the police officer's wishes, ul-
timately decides the issue of appeal.'
Model Rule 1.8(f) forbids a lawyer from accepting third-party com-
pensation for representation, unless such party does not interfere in
the attorney-client relationship and the lawyer's independent judg-
ment.182 Hence, when the municipal client's interests are allowed to
predominate in the joint representation, and the attorney's ability to
zealously advocate for one of her clients is affected-simply because
the municipality is paying-the ethics rules are violated. 83 In this sit-
uation, the municipal attorney's representation of the police officer is
affected so greatly by the municipality's funding of the representation
that the attorney should withdraw from the joint representation.
Additionally, it is difficult to prevent an attorney representing co-
defendants from using the shared confidences of one client against
that client in the defense of the other client.184 Therefore, adherence
to Rule 1.6's protection of client confidences is immeasurably impor-
tant to a lawyer who is simultaneously representing two clients on a
similar matter. 85 A lawyer must also remember that they must ad-
here to the strict confidentiality requirements of Rule 1.6 when a third
179. Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.7(b).
180. See William Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government
Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 How. L.J. 539, 552-
55 (1986) (describing a case in which the corporation counsel and the client so greatly
disagreed on whether to appeal that the client sought an order to remove counsel);
supra note 104 and accompanying text.
181. Corporation Counsel Interview, supra note 69.
182. Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.8(f).
183. "Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recom-
mend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the law-
yer's other responsibilities or interests." Id- Rule 1.7 cmt. 4.
184. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
185. Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.6; see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 358, at 4-5 (1990) (explaining that adherence to
Rule 1.6, for one client, may require a lawyer to withdraw from the representation of
another client).
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person is paying for the client's representation."' A person who pro-
vides compensation for another's representation does not gain the sta-
tus of a client and cannot become privy to information related to the
representation. Even though the municipality is also a party to a
§ 1983 action, the municipal attorney must still adhere to Rule 1.6 and
protect the police officer's communications from all others, including
other clients. The municipal attorney faces a struggle in attempting to
both protect these co-defendant's communications and advocate zeal-
ously for each of her clients; an almost impossible task for any attor-
ney in such a situation.
The municipality's indemnification of the police officer in § 1983
suits also seemingly presents conflict of interest problems for a munic-
ipal attorney jointly representing the police officer and the municipal-
ity. Practice reveals, however, that the municipal attorney sets aside
the issue of indemnification until after the litigation has terminated
and tends to discount it as only a potential conflict during the litiga-
tion.'8 7 Many municipal attorneys assert, and courts have agreed,'M
that as long as both defendants claim the same affirmative defense-
that the officer was acting in the scope of his employment-and the
municipality agrees to indemnify the police officer, that a presumed
alignment of interests precludes an actual conflict.18 These, however,
are not adequate safeguards in light of the differences that may arise
between the police officer's and the municipality's needs, as well as
the potential divided loyalties of the municipal attorney.' 90 For in-
stance, some municipalities determine whether to indemnify the po-
lice officer at the end of the litigation, and the decision to represent
does not necessarily lead to indemnification.19' Therefore, these mu-
nicipalities cannot guarantee protection from conflicts. Furthermore,
municipalities may extend indemnification as a virtual certainty to a
police officer, in order to obtain his consent to a settlement or even to
waive conflicts that may arise. The uncertainty of indemnification is
186. Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.8(0(3) (stating that a lawyer can only ac-
cept payment from a third party if the lawyer protects client confidences in accord-
ance with Rule 1.6).
187. In Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Authority, the Corporation Counsel ig-
nored the potential conflict involved in indemnification and argued that there was no
danger of conflict because the officer was found to have acted within the scope of his
duties in order to receive representation. 796 F. Supp. 84, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
188. See Richmond Hilton Assocs. v. City of Richmond, 690 F.2d 1086, 1089 (4th
Cir. 1982); Manganella v. Keyes, 613 F. Supp. 795, 799 (D. Conn. 1985); Minneapolis
Police Officers Fed'n v. City of Minneapolis, 488 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992); In re Opinion 552 of Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, 507 A-2d 233,
236 (NJ. 1986).
189. Opinion 552, 507 A.2d at 236.
190. Even the practices in Nassau and Suffolk Counties, where the indemnification
boards determine at the outset of litigation whether they will indemnify the police
officer, do not cure the conflicts that arise regarding settlement and appeal. See Doyle
& Blumenthal, supra note 90, at 29.
191. See supra part I.D.2.
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exacerbated by the fact that only the police officer is susceptible to
punitive damages, and that it is often less clear whether a municipality
will indemnify these damages. 192 Municipal attorneys and police of-
ficers may be willing to ignore any conflicts that arise because they
believe, however erroneously, that there is only a small chance that
the police officer will be held personally liable so long as both defend-
ants claim the same affirmative defense.' 93
As this section demonstrates, problems arise even if a municipality
argues that the police officer acted within the scope of his employ-
ment, and says it will provide indemnification for any damages. Mu-
nicipal attorneys, however, do not view these important issues as
actual conflicts of interest during the joint representation, and conse-
quently continue the joint representation without the close scrutiny
that these issues warrant. Moreover, in municipalities where outside
representation is provided to police officers in certain conflict situa-
tions, the municipal attorney may be pressured to retain the represen-
tation in-house to keep costs to a minimum. Therefore, she may be
willing to close her eyes to situations of differing interests and needs.
To summarize this part, four main conflicts of interest arise for mu-
nicipal attorneys representing police officers and municipalities in
§ 1983 suits. First, the lawyer's duty to explain her role and the con-
flicts that may arise, as well as Rule 1.6's duty of confidentiality, are
critical at the initial consulation phase. Second, municipal attorneys
risk violating Rule 1.7(a)'s prohibition against simultaneous represen-
tation when they jointly represent municipal clients and police officers
who may have acted outside the scope of their employment. Third,
municipal attorneys-whether the original screening attorney or
not-violate Rule 1.9's prohibition against representing clients whose
interests are adverse to a former client's interests when they continue
to represent the municipality after withdrawing from the police of-
ficer's representation. And finally, looking at the totality of the con-
flicts that can occur-particularly in regard to settlement, judgment,
indemnfication, and appeal-municipal attorneys likely violate Rule
192. See supra part I.D.2.
193. Linda M. Cronin, an attorney at a firm that represents the New York City
police officers' union, offers this story to illustrate how some municipalities' current
indemnification procedures add to the problems that arise in this joint representation
context:
[T]he police officers were represented by the city of New York through the
trial. The city said... the police officers had done nothing wrong. [T]he
jury returned a verdict against the police officers for compensatory damages
in excess of $70 million. The jury also returned a verdict against each of the
police officers for $1 million in punitive damages. The city appealed the
verdict and is now backpedaling as to whether it will indemnify the police
officers for the compensatory and punitive damages .... [I]t appears that
even under these optimal circumstances, there is no guarantee of indemnifi-
cation for the police officer or payment of the judgment for the plaintiff.
Cronin, supra note 67, at 97.
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1.7(b)'s prohibition against representing clients whose representation
may be affected by outside factors. The next part will discuss institu-
tional responses to these conflicts.
III. ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE THE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
THE JOINT REPRESENTATION OF POLICE OFFICERS AND
MUNICIPALITIES IN SECTION 1983 Surs
Few courts or ethics committees have addressed the conflicts of in-
terest discussed in part H. This part describes the limited role that
courts and ethics committees have taken in the conflicts of interest
debate. In response to this lack of attention, this part also proposes a
new approach to the representation of police officers and municipali-
ties in § 1983 actions.
A. Courts' and Ethics Committees' Responses to the Joint
Representation of Police Officers and Municipalities
In the context of § 1983 joint representation actions involving mu-
nicipal attorneys, courts usually enter the picture when a disqualifica-
tion motion is brought against the attorney who is representing the
police officer and the municipality. 194 In addition to suits brought by
the oppposing party, the police officer himself sometimes moves for
disqualification when he wishes to retain separate representation paid
for by the municipality.195 Courts may also review a police officer's
request to reverse a judgment against him based on his claim that he
did not receive adequate representation. 9'
A court's decision to grant or deny a disqualification motion, how-
ever, does not necessarily indicate whether an attorney has committed
an ethical violation. This may be because courts vary in their treat-
ment of the conflict rules in determining whether a lawyer should be
disqualified. 97 Some courts rely exclusively on the ABA ethical rules,
while others reject that approach and instead look to the spirit of the
rules in light of the circumstances of a particular case.198 Conse-
194. See, e.g., Clay v. Doherty, 608 F. Supp. 295, 297 (N.D. M11. 985) (noting that
plaintiff is seeking disqualification of defendants' counsel); Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F.
Supp. 87, 88 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (stating that plaintiffs filed motion to disqualify defense
counsel).
195. See England v. Town of Clarkstown, 634 N.Y.S.2d 958, 959 (App. Div. 1995);
Galligan v. City of Schenectady, 497 N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (App. Div. 1986).
196. See Gordon v. Norman, 788 F.2d 1194, 1196 (6th Cir. 1986); Dunton v. County
of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 907-08 (2d Cir. 1984).
197. See Bateman, supra note 19, at 250-51; Green, supra note 22, at 77; McMinn,
supra note 14, at 1236.
198. See Green, supra note 22, at 77 & n.32. For example, the court in Galligan,
looked to the municipality's representation statute to determine the existence of a
conflict that would warrant disqualification. Galligan, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 187. But see
England, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 960 (rejecting statutory approach and adopting focus on
ethical considerations to conflicts).
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quently, a court's dismissal of a disqualification motion does not nec-
essarily clear the attorney of a violation of the ethics conflict rules. 199
Moreover, most courts have been reluctant to disturb the police of-
ficer's choice of counsel without an actual, present conflict of inter-
est.200 In part, this is because many courts do not wish to serve as
disciplinarians for members of the bar.20 1 Also, as explained above,
not every court employs the ABA ethics rules in determining disquali-
fication motions, and therefore, their definition of an ethical conflict
of interest may be different than the Model Rules' definition.202 Ac-
cordingly, courts faced with a disqualification motion in a § 1983 suit
have found that an actual conflict of interest exists only when the co-
defendants' defenses are in direct conflict.203 Additionally, courts are
hesitant to disqualify an attorney in the event of a mere potential con-
flict of interest because courts are often of the view that disqualifica-
tion serves a remedial function and should only be employed to avert
actual harm to the client or the court.20  Courts also may be unwilling
to disqualify attorneys because the conflict may be outweighed by the
heavy burden disqualification places on the court and the litigants.20 5
No court has specifically addressed the conflicts that can arise as a
result of the differing interests between the police officer and the mu-
nicipality with regard to settlement, punitive damages, indemnifica-
tion, and appeal. Many courts have held that as long as a municipality
agrees to indemnify the officer and continues to contend that the of-
ficer acted in his official capacity, no conflicting interests exist and
joint representation is permissible.20 6 This view, however, contradicts
the ethical rules that prohibit a fee arrangement by a third party to
influence the lawyer's professional judgment,20 7 or affect his adher-
ence to the conflicts rules20 8 and the attorney-client relationship. 209
199. See, e.g., Smith v. City of New York, 611 F. Supp. 1080, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(finding that violations of a Model Code Canon is not enough for disqualification).
200. See, e.g., Clay v. Doherty, 608 F. Supp. 295, 303-04 (N.D. II. 1985) (finding
that until an actual and unreasonable conflict exists choice of "counsel should not be
disturbed"); Galligan, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 187 (stating that the New York statute does not
require the court to determine the possibility of a conflict).
201. See Clay, 608 F. Supp. at 304 (reasoning that the court will yield to the bar's
self-regulation); Green, supra note 22, at 74.
202. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., Richmond Hilton Assocs. v. City of Richmond, 690 F.2d 1086, 1089
(4th Cir. 1982) (affirming trial court's determination that disqualification cannot be
based on the possibility that co-defendants' positions may conflict).
204. Smith v. City of New York, 611 F. Supp. 1080, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (discuss-
ing denial of disqualification motions unless the conduct of an attorney will "taint the
underlying trial"); see Green, supra note 22, at 74-75 & n.15.
205. See Green, supra note 22, at 90. Professor Green argues that disqualification
burdens the client rather than punishing the conduct of the lawyer. He proposes per-
sonal sanctions against the lawyer personally as the proper punishment for lawyers
who violate conflict rules. Id. at 91-95; see McMinn, supra note 14, at 1249-50.
206. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
207. See Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.8(f)(2).
208. See id. Rule 1.8(0(3) & cmt. 4.
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Courts' analyses of these conflicts are even more unsettling because
they tend to confuse the meaning of "official capacity" suits and the
police officer's defense that he was acting "within the scope of his
official duties." Two cases in the Southern District of New York ex-
emplify this problem. In Katz v. Morgenthau,21 0 for example, the
court correctly found that a conflict of interest will not exist if the
police officer is only sued in his official capacity because, in this situa-
tion, he will not be held personally liable.2 ' A few years later, an-
other court disagreed with the Katz court's logic and found that a
potential conflict exists so long as the officer, in his official capacity,
can assert a qualified immunity defense while the municipality cannot
assert this defense.212 In a § 1983 action, however, a police officer
cannot assert a qualified immunity defense in his official capacity be-
cause an official capacity suit is treated as a suit against the municipal-
ity.21 3 The police officer can only plead the defenses available to the
municipality and qualified immunity is not one of the available de-
fenses. 214 The courts' confusion has increased the need for a coherent
examination of multiple representation of co-defendants in § 1983
actions.
Additionally, it must be remembered that a municipality has the
ability to change its defense at any time,215 and courts have refused to
adopt a per se rule prohibiting joint representation even in light of this
fact. Most jurisdictions have instead adopted a case-by-case evalua-
tion of the adequacy of representation in § 1983 suits.2 16 These courts
have called for an increased "sensitivity to the risk of conflict,"2 17 as
well as an awareness by judges and litigants of their duty to guard
client's interests and ensure that the client fully understands the
situation.218
209. See id. Rule 1.8(0(2).
210. 709 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
211. Il at 1227-28.
212. Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth., 796 F. Supp. 84, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
213. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); see supra part I.B.
214. See supra part I.B.
215. See supra part II.C.
216. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
217. Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1142, 1147 (7th Cir. 1987); accord Gordon v. Nor-
man, 788 F.2d 1194, 1198 (6th Cir. 1986).
218. See Gordon, 788 F.2d at 1198; Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 909
(2d Cir. 1984) (explaining that attorneys are officers of the court and should notify
court of conflicts). Some courts have adopted a procedure whereby counsel notifies
the court of the potential conflict. Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 85 F.3d 489,
494 (10th Cir. 1996); Kounitz v. Slaatten, 901 F. Supp. 650,659 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (expli-
cating test established in Dunton, 729 F.2d 903). The court then determines whether
the individual defendant fully understands the conflict. Johnson, 85 F.3d at 494; Dun-
ton, 729 F.2d at 908; Kounitz, 901 F. Supp. at 659. The individual defendant, then, is
entitled to waive the conflict and choose joint representation. Johnson, 85 F.3d at 494;
Dunton, 729 F.2d at 909 n.5; Kounitz, 901 F. Supp. at 659.
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Only one court has found the potential conflicts in § 1983 suits so
serious as to make joint representation impermissible.219 A federal
district court in Texas found that even if an actual conflict did not arise
at trial, separate counsel should be the norm in § 1983 suits. 220 The
court held that the high potential for abuse, as well as the hardship
that would be imposed on the court should separate counsel be re-
tained in the middle of litigation, warranted separate counsel in ac-
tions against police officers in their individual and official
capacities.2'
Moreover, because most courts have approached § 1983 attorney
conflicts of interest violations on a case-by-case basis, they have failed
to look at the joint representation conundrum with an eye toward pro-
posing broader solutions for the recurring problems discussed earlier.
Courts have called upon legislatures and ethics committees to ex-
amine the great potential for conflict in this type of joint representa-
tion.222 But neither ethics committees, nor other types of disciplinary
agencies, have effectively answered this call to enforce violations of
the conflict rules.223 This failure is demonstrated by one ethics com-
mittee's unsuccessful attempt to formulate a per se rule against joint
representation. In 1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court Advisory
Committee on Professional Ethics adopted a formal opinion banning
simultaneous representations of a governmental body and a govern-
ment official or employee in a § 1983 action." 4 The Committee found
that due to the "infinite combination of factual and legal circum-
stances. . . under which the problem of dual representation of govern-
mental bodies and their officials and employees will arise, and the
wide variety of conflicting decisions which members of the bar would
arrive at,"225 one rule applicable to solve all the problems-qualified
immunity, liability for punitive damages, and issues of settlement, in-
demnification, and appeal-was justified.226 Less than one year later,
however, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an opinion disagree-
ing with the Committee's formal opinion. 7 The New Jersey Supreme
Court found the per se rule of prohibition against joint representa-
tions to be overly broad and unnecessary to solve the possible ethical
219. See Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
220. See id, at 89-90.
221. let
222. See, e.g., Gordon v. Norman, 788 F.2d 1194, 1199 n.5 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting
that these representations are "a troublesome area" and that courts "should be aware
of potential ethical violations and possible malpractice claims").
223. See Developments in the Law: Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Re-
sponses, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1547, 1597-605 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Reg-
ulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 801, 829 (1992).
224. N.J. Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 552 (1985).
225. Id.
226. let
227. In re Opinion 552 of Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, 507 A.2d 233
(N.J. 1986).
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problems.2'8 The New Jersey court admitted that it was moved, in
particular, by the financial burden a per se rule would impose on local
governments and individual defendants who would have to retain in-
dependent counsel.2 9 This argument, as well as the belief that liti-
gants are entitled to counsel of their choice,2  and that municipal
counsel will be able to objectively determine when joint representa-
tion will be appropriate, 231 has driven most jurisdictions to adopt a
case-by-case approach 3 2
B. A Proposal for a Per Se Prohibition Against the Joint
Representation of Police Officers and Municipalities in
Section 1983 Actions
The approach of municipalities and courts to the representation of
police officers and municipalities in § 1983 actions illustrates that nu-
merous ethical violations occur both prior to and during the joint rep-
resentation. 33  Joint representation of police officers and
municipalities in the § 1983 context places too many burdens on those
involved in the litigation. These burdens include: (1) burdens on the
municipal attorney to balance both clients' interests and confidences;
(2) burdens on courts who must closely supervise the litigation to en-
sure that all clients are fully informed of potential conflicts; (3) bur-
dens on police officers who must ensure that the municipal attorney is
truly meeting their legal needs; and (4) burdens on the municipality
which must continually supervise the litigation to determine whether
to represent and indemnify the officer. This complicated web of vary-
ing interests justifies a prohibition against joint representation.
A per se rule prohibiting dual representation is the only way to ef-
fectively guard against the inherent conflicts of interest that exist in
the joint representation of police officers and municipalities in § 1983
actions. To avoid being overbroad, the per se rule should prohibit
joint representation only when the police officer is sued in both his
individual and official capacities, or in his individual capacity alone.2-
The rule would automatically require separate representation of the
police officer and the municipality from the moment that notice of the
228. Id at 235-36.
229. Id at 239.
230. See Clay v. Doherty, 608 F. Supp. 295, 304 (N.D. IM. 1985) (stating that until
defendant's choice of counsel "gives rise to actual and unreasonable conflicts, [his]
choice of counsel should not be disturbed").
231. See id (stating that courts must assume that government attorneys adhere to
ethical rules); imneapolis Police Officers Fed'n v. City of Minneapolis, 488 N.W.2d
817, 821 (Minn. CL App. 1992) (same); Opinion 552, 507 A.2d at 239 (finding that
attorney can best decide when joint representation is appropriate).
232. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
233. See supra part II.
234. If the police officer is sued only in his official capacity, the possibility for con-
flicts to arise may be less substantial, and thus may not necessarily require separate
representation.
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suit is served. A municipal attorney could represent the municipal
client, but could not represent the police officer.
If municipalities do away with the requirement that the attorney
must first determine the scope of the officer's action in order to pro-
vide representation, conflicts that arise in the initial screening inter-
view between the police officer and the municipal attorney vanish.235
Such a per se rule also removes the pressure on police officers, munic-
ipalities, and municipal attorneys to waive conflicts of interest that oc-
cur in order to preserve less-expensive in-house representation.236
This procedure will guard against the attorney's need to withdraw
from the police officer's representation during the course of the litiga-
tion. 7 In addition, attorneys will avoid a violation of Rule 1.9, which
prohibits representing clients whose interests are adverse to former
clients' interests once they "cut loose" the police officer during the
representation. 238 Even if the officer's separate attorney learns that
the officer was not acting within the scope of his employment, she has
no allegiances to another client-for example, the municipality-who
could use this information to its advantage. Moreover, separate rep-
resentation will better protect the police officer's communications to
his attorney from use by the municipality or third persons.239 Sepa-
rate representation will ensure that attorneys are not pressured to vio-
late their ethical duty of confidentiality to one client to help advocate
for another client.240 The police officer's counsel will be empowered
to work with the municipal attorney to determine the best course of
action for the litigation based on the information that her police of-
ficer client has given her. Accordingly, all clients will be provided
with an attorney to exclusively advocate for their best interests in de-
ciding issues of settlement, appeal, and litigation strategy.241
235. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
237. See supra part II.C.
238. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text; Model Rules, supra note 14,
Rule 1.9.
239. See supra part II.A.
240. See supra text accompanying note 121.
241. See supra part II.D. This proposal, however, raises the question of how to
diminish the financial burden that conflict-free representation would impose on mu-
nicipalities and police officers. One answer is to have a specific § 1983 litigation legal
fund for police officers. The fund could be financed partly through moderate dues of
the police officers, but largely by the municipality. The fund would be allotted a fixed
annual budget that, of course, must be sizable enough to pay the full cost of litigation.
Indemnification should be determined as early as possible during the litigation.
Hopefully, the benefits gained by providing the police officer with separate represen-
tation would minimize the conflicts that would occur even if the police officer is faced
with the uncertainty of whether he will receive full indemnification. With representa-
tion being provided to almost all police officers, regardless of the scope of their ac-
tions, it is important that the municipality get the opportunity to evaluate the officer's
actions before committing the public's taxdollars.
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Without a per se rule, conflicts will continue to go unchecked in
cases where municipal attorneys represent both police officers and
municipalities. Disciplinary bodies are not effective enforcers of vio-
lations of the ethics rules. 42 Although courts have an "overall re-
sponsibility... to supervise the ethical conduct of the Bar,"2 4 3 courts
have been reluctant, absent a direct conflict of interest, to disturb a
client's choice of counsel or to disrupt the litigation by disqualifying
attorneys.2' In addition, a court's disqualification of an attorney, or
an attorney's withdrawal from the representation of the police officer,
does not solve every conflict of interest problem. Courts have been
virtually silent about the inherent conflicts of interest that municipal
attorneys face in § 1983 litigation. For example, no court has ad-
dressed the municipal attorney's ethical violations of the former client
rule when she continues the representation of the municipal client af-
ter withdrawing from the police officer's defense.245 Even though the
possibility always exists that this conflict will arise, the nature of
§ 1983 actions has caused courts to be reluctant in disqualifying attor-
neys based simply on the fact that the municipality may change its
defense later in the litigation.2 6 This is due, in part, to courts' increas-
ing tolerance of screening mechanisms that they believe safeguard
abuse.247
In view of courts' reluctance to address the inherent conflicts in
§ 1983 joint representations, the ABA should take the lead in promul-
gating a per se rule prohibiting joint representation of police officers
and municipalities. It should also lobby states and local municipalities
to amend the representation statutes to that effect. Many would argue
that the cost of requiring separate representation would be over-
whelming for a public entity, and therefore, joint representation is suf-
ficient unless an actual conflict-a situation in which the co-
defendants are arguing conflicting defenses-exists. The inference
from this argument is that due to limited funds, and the nature of par-
ticular law practices, certain types of lawyers should be exempt from
the professional code of ethics. Nowhere in any of the ethical codes
do the authors suggest that the rules are inapplicable to a particular
class of lawyers.' Municipal attorneys, like all attorneys, should be
242. See Green, supra note 22, at 88-89; supra note 223.
243. Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 908 n,4 (2d Cir. 1984).
244. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
246. See supra part I.B.
247. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
248. See Model Rules, supra note 14, Scope. The National Bar Association of At-
torneys General tried unsuccessfully to persuade the American Bar Association to
specify that several of the Model Rules, such as the conflicts of interest provisions,
were inapplicable to government lawyers. Josephson & Pearce, supra note 180, at 557
n.86. This rejection highlights the legal community's fear that allowing government
lawyers to disregard the traditional ethical approach will give them too much
discretion.
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held to the same ethical standards of conduct and should adhere to
the traditional conflict of interest rules. Any other approach will in-
fringe on the present attorney-client structure in which the client di-
rects the representation,249 and will severely restrict the interests of
municipal-employee clients like police officers.
CONCLUSION
An inherent divergence of interests exists everytime a municipal at-
torney represents both a police officer and a municipality in the same
§ 1983 police misconduct case. These differing interests substantially
affect the actions of the municipal attorney and give rise to several
instances of divided loyalties that cause the attorney to violate the
ethical conflict of interest rules. Additionally, the many statutes that
currently allow municipal attorneys to jointly represent police officers
and municipalities also violate the ethics rules and do not provide a
sufficient guide for how municipal attorneys should handle conflict
situations.
The many potential conflicts of interest that can arise are "far too
serious to permit joint representation.., even in the face of an appar-
ent waiver signed by both of these defendants."" 0 A per se rule
against joint representation of a municipality and a police officer in
cases where a police officer is sued in his individual and official capac-
ity, is the only way to guard against the endless conflicts that can arise,
and to ensure that both defendants are provided with zealous
advocates.
249. Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.2(a); Model Code, supra note 14, EC 7-7;
see id. EC 7-8.
250. Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F. Supp. 87, 90 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
[Vol. 652862
